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On The Relationship between Regime Approval and Democratic Transition
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Gregory A. Petrow, University of Nebraska Omaha1
Presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Seattle, Washington, August 31-Sept 3, 2011

INTRODUCTION
Democratic transition scholars find a large number of factors associated with the likelihood of
non-democratic regimes transitioning to democracy. Of these, three factors appear to be among
the most potent: economic development, economic crisis, and the type of non-democratic
regime.2 However, these structural types of analyses beg the question of how public opinion
affects national transition to democracy. In other words, these three factors may affect popular
attitudes that can create dynamics that foment democratization. One type of attitude that may be
especially important is the publics’ approval of non-democratic regimes. The chief limitation
that prevents scholars from addressing this question is the absence of data. However, we have
access to the largest repository of international public opinion data that is comparable for all
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nations – the Gallup World Poll.3 The Gallup organization began the World Poll in 2006, and
now has surveyed approximately 500,000 people in over 150 nations, with a sample intended to
be representative of 95% of the world’s population. This allows us access to measures of regime
approval, as well as other relevant variables, for most non-democratic nations during this time.
Because five years has passed since the World Poll began, we can consider the
relationships between regime approval and levels of democratization. We restrict our analysis to
a set of 24 nations that were non-democratic in 2005, and we use regime approval to predict prodemocratic movement in those nations’ institutions. We use the Polity IV Democracy Score as
our index of democratization. The Polity IV Democracy Score is a conceptual scheme that is
unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in
governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. This
perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized
autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully
institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a
21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).4
3

The Gallup World Poll (Gallup Organization 2006) is a public opinion survey of human wellbeing conducted in over 150 countries. We first utilized this dataset to ascertain the extent to
which the Cuban people approved of the regime, and the extent to which those attitudes
influenced the trajectory toward democratic governance in the post-Fidel environment. Utilizing
this Cuban public opinion data, we estimated structural equation models (SEMs) to evaluate the
possibility of Cuban regime stability and transition. Specifically, we found that collective
esteem increased satisfaction with the government. While we allow that there may be a rise of
expectations on behalf of the Cuban people for more changes, because of the nature of collective
esteem in Cuba, it does not necessarily imply a demand for regime change. See, J. BenjaminAlvarado and G. Petrow, “Stability, Transition and Regime Approval in Post-Castro Cuba.”
Political Science Quarterly, (Forthcoming Fall 2011).
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In this paper we utilize an ordinary least squares regression analysis to ascertain the
relationship between regime approval and the polity measure of democracy. This is a preliminary
analysis for a larger research project in which we will incorporate “structural” explanations for
democratization and democratic transition by estimating structural equation models in which we
will incorporate several explanations for democratic transition – international integration,5
economic growth,6 repression,7 and regime type.8 This paper represents the initial exploration of
this topic.9 Controlling for regime type, we expect that lower levels of regime approval lead to a
greater transition to democracy.
METHODOLOGY
The dependent variable in our analysis in the change in the polity score from 2005 to
2010 among nations that were non-democratic in 2005. Negative values of the polity score
reflect non-democratic nations, and we selected nations that in 2005 ranged from moderately
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In future analyses, we seek to demonstrate the degree to which those structural factors operate
by influencing individual-level factors, such as social capital, personal income, and evaluations
of the national economy. In other words, the model may allow us to capture how structural
factors affect individual-level factors, with both predicting regime approval, and in turn,
democratization. This study will open the black box of how mass politics and public opinion
affects democratic transition, addressing the question of how structural factors impact the masses
to encourage, or inhibit, transitions to democracy.
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non-democratic (at -3) to strongly non-democratic (at -10). We found 24 such nations. We use
the regime approval measure from the Gallup World Poll in those nations to predict the degree to
which their institutions became more democratic.
The regime approval variable is a scale composed of four questions from the World Poll.
The respondents indicated whether or they not had confidence in: the national government, the
military, and the courts. They also indicated if they approved or disapproved of their national
leaders. This resulted in a five-point scale, and the alpha was above .60 for all nations.
RESULTS
We turn now to the results in Table 1. In Table 1 we report the results of an OLS
Regression in which change in the polity score from 2005 to 2010 is the dependent variable.
Positive values of this dependent variable indicate nations transitioning in a more democratic
direction, zero indicates no change at all, and negative values reflect nations transitioning in a
less democratic way. We bold the result for our theoretical variable of interest – that for regime
approval.
[Table 1 about here]
We find that higher levels of regime approval lead to less of a transition toward
democracy among non-democratic nations (b= -.88, p<.02). We include a basic set of controls in
this model. We control for the demographic characteristics of the national polities. Considering
these controls, only age is related at the p<.05 level to democratic transition, with older people
tending to live in nations that transitioned away from democracy (b= -.02, p<.02). We also
controlled for regime type with a series of dummy variables. The excluded regime type category
is for nations with democratic institutions. The only statistically significant result is for the
theocracy of Iran, with the coefficient indicating that this regime type had a negative influence
4

on democratic transition, once the other variables in the model are accounted for (b= -2.07,
p<.01). Finally, the control variables for time are not statistically significant.
To confirm that the dependent variable is reflecting transition toward democracy, we
report Table 2. We defined a non-democratic nation as one with a polity score of -3 or lower in
2005. We then created the difference variable, and we find that most of the nations we count as
non-democratic in 2005 either did not transition, or they changed in a more democratic direction.
Three nations moved in a slightly less democratic direction (with a score of -1): Bahrain, Iran
and Rwanda. A host of nations did not change. However, Sudan and Togo became somewhat
more democratic (with a +2 change), and Mauritania even a bit more so (with a +3 change).
Two nations changed dramatically: Pakistan (+11) and Nepal (+12). One may be concerned that
there is little variation on the polity change variable, but we can see that the variance is pretty
evenly distributed across the categories.
[Table 2 about here]
Finally, we depict our result for regime approval from Table 1 in an intuitive form – the
change in the predicted polity score. We report this result in Figure 1. The vertical axis is the
change in the Polity score from 2005 to 2010 among all of the non-democratic nations. The
horizontal axis reflects the categories of the regime approval scale, with higher values indicating
higher levels of regime approval. All values of the regime approval scale indicate a positive
polity score, showing that the average movement of the non-democratic nations from 2005 to
2010 was in a democratic direction. Of course, one notices that the slope is negative, indicating
that higher levels of approval corresponded with less positive polity change scores. In other
words, nations with higher regime approval transitioned less to democracy than nations with
lower regime approval scores. All decreases in the average polity score are statistically
5

significant at the p<.05 level, two-tailed. The bars reflect how the sample divided up among the
categories of the regime approval scale. About 40% of the cases clustered at the most positive
end, while about a third were at the bottom end, with the rest at various points in between.
CONCLUSION
We began by laying out our expectation that approval of regimes in non-democratic
nations would affect whether or not those nations transitioned to democracy. One might have
reason to expect that there wouldn’t be such a relationship. Perhaps people who disapprove of
their non-democratic leaders don’t necessarily want democracy. There is some evidence,
however, that people in non-democratic regimes do see democracy as something to turn to. For
example, one scholar finds that the Chinese who distrust their leaders also have stronger
preferences for democratic elections.10
Even if non-democratic regime members do support democracy more as regime
disapproval rises, these types of regimes still lack any formal institutions through which public
sentiment can affect the regime. Perhaps, then, these sentiments lack any way to affect
democratization. However, even without formal mechanisms, rulers can still be subject to the
public will. There are a myriad of informal ways that approval, or disapproval, can manifest
itself. One example is public protest. Another is that the individuals who participate in
governance may disapprove of the leadership themselves.

Lianjiang Li 2011. “Distrust in Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and
Preference for Popular Elections in Rural China.” Political Behavior 33(2): 291-311.
10
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Table 1. Regime Approval Predicts Democratic Transition among Non-Democratic
Nations, 2010-2005
Independent Variable Coefficient
Regime
-.88
approval

.35

Standard Error
2.52

T-statistic

P-value
<.02

Demographic
Controls
Female

-.07

.04

1.4

<.20

Age

-.02

.01

2.65

<.02

Married

.56

.30

1.90

<.10

Standard of
living

-.10

.30

.32

<.80

Entrepreneur

-.20

.40

.50

<.70

Dictatorships

2.15

2.23

.97

<.40

Monarchies

-.77

.55

1.4

<.20

One Party

-.88

.52

1.68

<.15

Theocracy (Iran)

-2.07

.65

3.18

<.01

Transitioning

3.31

3.82

.87

<.40

2007

.88

.57

1.55

<.15

2008

-.72

.80

.9

<.40

2009

-.33

.45

.74

<.50

2010

.27

.71

.38

<.75

Intercept

1.92

.80

2.41

<.05

Regime types

Controls for time

R2 = .26

N = 79,375

Standard error adjusted for 25 clusters
7

Table 2. Distribution of the Change in the Polity Score from 2005 to 2010 among NonDemocratic nations
Polity Direction

Survey cases*

Percent of all survey cases

-1

8,386

10.6

0

45,297

57.1

2

4,735

6.0

3

5,683

7.2

5

4,795

6.0

11

6,023

7.6

12

4,456

5.6

79,375

100.1

* -1 = Bahrain, Iran and Rwanda
*0 = Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, China, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait,
Laos, Morocco, Qatar, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisian, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam
*2 = Sudan and Togo
*3 = Mauritania
*11 = Pakistan
*12 = Nepal
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